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E.U. AND „MADE EASTERN EUROPE REFORM”: FROM OLD PERESTROIKA 
(RESTRUCTURING) TO NEW EUROPEAN (CONSTRUCTION) 
 
Anca Parmena OLIMID 
 
 For European Union and Eastern Europe, the immediate legacy of the Cold War was 
the decisive torn-parts of the world history, because the dangerous „ myth of the red cell” and 
the Soviet collapse in 1989 announced the new foreign policy of East. This analysis searches 
to be a key instrument for E.U. - Central and Eastern European countries political approach 
and economic adjustment. For the West, the communist system’s failure was evident and 
emphasis a new aspect for the East relations. In particular, this new Central and East reality 
concerns three concentric circles: 
 
The first circle: 
 Rethinking of national interests: from nostalgia time to european dream  
 
Many analyses agree that Eastern European policy reflects major changes. But what 
will be the internal situation? Why has economic growth or institutional reforms in some 
transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union been evident and stronger 
than in others ? Which will be the Western verdict: integration or rejection?  If economic and 
politic reforms bring clear benefits for countries in transition, as Romania and Russia, why 
have some conservative forces been so reluctant to accept and promote them? What will be the 
new relation with these forces? These questions complicated an already complex transition, 
adding a new difficulty to reform program.  
This analysis looks at the policy and institutional reforms that encourage the growth of 
new economies in transition while imposing financial discipline and responsibility on the old 
soviet economy inherited from the socialist past. The Stalinist system implemented after the 
Second World War and lasted until the 1990’s became a system collapsed incredibly quickly.  
At the end of 1980’s, USSR believed they had solved the problem of nationalism and ethnic 
conflict within multinational state. But socialist planning was in fact the gravedigger of the 
Soviet system. At the center disintegrated, Gorbachev opened up the political process with 
 2
glasnost (openness)1. After 45 years of „successful” communist policy, the conservative forces 
gained considerable ground in key places, dealing the country’s future. In his 1992 Foreign 
Affairs article, „Russia and Eastern Europe: Will the West Let Them Fail? America and the 
World”, John Mroz agree that in 1990-1995 economic conditions declined dramatically in 
Russia, leading to rise of conservative forces and increased expressions of anti-capitalism.  
Initially skeptical because of past experience, Eastern European transition announced a 
rethinking of national interests: from nostalgia time to european dream.  After 1990, this 
„made Eastern Europe reform” potentially more dangerous that other predecessor, saves the 
East from the dangers of its own traditionally thinking, because the Cold War was not a simple 
case of Soviet expansionism and American reaction2. The end of the communist influence was 
the  period of change after sixty years of hard communism. 1989 was called as-the pivotal 
year of  20 th century3. It was the year in which the events changed the military and politically 
face of Eastern Europe and its relation with European Union. The nostalgia time became „a 
dead illusion”. This period encompassed events in the USSR and Eastern Europe, 
transforming the post-Cold War and much of our century’s geopolitical landscape. For all 
specialists, the most striking characteristic of the relationships developed at the end of 1980’s 
was compromise rather than change.  
The E.U.-Soviet relation has gone through several pendulum swings. The USSR 
renounced the „Brezhnev doctrine” and condemned the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia4; 
Romania was the bloody exception to the peaceful transition. E.U policy- makers call it „the 
bad side of freedom”: perestroika (restructuring) turned into katarastroika, a neologism that 
was heard more and more on Moscow’s streets as reform program faltered and then failed. 
Therefore, I would like to note the major concessions that Gorbachev agrees to do on arms 
control, withdrawn Soviet troops from the bloody Afghanistan, reject the existence and 
                                               
1 Gerard K. Haines, At Cold War’s End: U.S. Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989-1991, 
published by The Center for the Study of Inteligence (CSI) of the Center Intelligence Agency and George W. 
Bush for Presidential Studies at Texas A&M University co-sponsoring  the conference U.S. Intelligence and the 
End of Cold War on Texas A&M University Campus at College Station from 18 to 20 November 1999, p. 2 
2 For a general overview, see Courtois Stephane, Werth Nicolas, Le livre noir de communism, Robert Laffront, 
Paris, 1997. 
3 Neal Ascherson, 1989 stands  out as a pivotal year in the 20 th century: Chain reaction ends Cold War, 
Washington Times, April 26, 1999, p. A 17. 
4 Anca Parmena Popescu, Les moyens d’intégration du bloc communist, allocution at University of Lille 3, Lille, 
class of „Etudes européennes ” („European Studies”), Lille, 19 November, 2001, p. 4. 
 3
importance of the old-fashioned class warfare in favor of democratic values on Russian 
foreign policy.  
Given the magnitude of these reforme and according to many experts observors, 
perestroika focused on the need to diminish the importance of Russian administration. 
Decision-making and  extensive programs werw designed to guide the transfer from central 
planning to market economy. Given Gorbachev’s determination to succed, perestroika 
involved and stimulated a sense of partenership between East and West, acknowledging the 
Warsaw Pact will be abolished, democratic regimes in Eastern Europe and newfound 
freedoms of speech and religion as professor Gerhard Rempel from Department of History of 
Western New England College explains: the communist control system and over-centralization 
of power and new policies produced no economic miracles.  
The West watched in disbelief reiterating the power of conservatives elements in 
Gorbachev’s own administration, because, for that matter, West dilemma regarded these 
ideological theories. For East, the introduced policies undoubtedly encounter domestic 
opposition. As a sustainable strategy for East, perestroika distinguished among other short-run 
perspectives, by exercising decisive influence over Russian later transition reform. Many West 
Europeans were painfully aware that before perestroika announcement West/East high 
priorities were increasingly divergent.  
Other hypothesys was forming arround 1990’s: for Gorbachev was difficult to 
determine what East needed to provide as an adequate reform system, because, however, 
ideology played a traditional role in Russian traditionnaly mentality, preserving and claiming 
its rule.  
This selection is comprehensive, because Western question was simple: What were 
Gorbachev’s intentions and motives?. Europeans initially regarded prestroika as a skeptical 
prospect, because it was the present image of socialism collapse, a wishful thinking about 
restoring dynamism to a communist system, but Gorbachev’s reform set up a new price for 
Russian democratic future… 
By late 1990, West analysts reached a consensus on perestroika policy goals. First of 
all, perestroika emphasis a continuation and intensification of current course of Russian 
economy that Gorbachev attemped to promote. Second of all, Russian reform system should 
implicate an unilateral agenda focused  on actually optimistic view: the mutual interest West-
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East by offering both concessions. The authors did, however, agree that the scenario two 
became possible after formating of Commonwealth of Independent States, Gorbachev’s 
resignation and Boris Yeltsin election. 
As in other war-torn parts of Europe’s history, for Romanian and Russian post-
communist transition added a dramatic disorientation to the uncertainty and trouble; there was 
a common perception of political transition: a growing sense of vulnerability and fear, dreams 
of new policy. In Russia, the intelligentsia (in the sense of the educated classes) are 
tenaciously and unobtrusively building up resistance to this sad state of affairs5. In such a 
volatile atmosphere, events and possible scenarios for the coming year could go in any number 
of directions. In their 1995 Foreign Affairs article: „Map, Compass and Horizon: When? 
Why?With Whom? ”, Dominique Moïsi and Michael Mertes expose a new theory: the 
communist’s funeral brought only a brief respite from the shared sense of loss over the lack of 
common goals, dreams of new frontiers and unifying visions… In 1990’s, Romanian 
transitions was still cautious; its initiative reflects a fundamental rethinking of national 
interests and ideology. Five years after the fall of Berlin Wall, Romania and Russia were 
„united” by their identity crises. 
1990’s events painted a depressing picture for most of former communist countries. 
Distracted by recession, Southeastern Europe made little headway in redefining its program, 
visions and priorities for a region changed by the collapse of Soviet power ant its ideology.  
 
  The second circle:  
  From national reality ... 
 
  For E.U., the freedom’s advantage, its flexibility and tolerance for change, does not 
ensure that the recovery will be long and satisfying.  
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, Central and Eastern Europe began 
to confront an unknown process: „transition". After ten years Russia and Romania are still 
coping with the demands and responsibilities of this process. Building free market economic 
systems, establishing democratic forms of governance is a complex, unknown and challenging 
                                               
5 Claude Frioux, Feeling the pinch/Painful transition for Russia’s intellectuals, from the web site du journal Le 
Monde Diplomatique: http://mondediplo.com/1998/11/03frioux, November 1998. 
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process. After the exercise of democracy in transition, we’ll try to find a definition of 
transition. Like any intellectual project, transition is, first of all, a historical interpretation, 
proving to be the main measure facing the reappearance of court phenomena reminiscent of 
the old conservative forces promoting a new type of Stalinist personality cult… 
  For Romania, at the beginning of 1990’s, there was a serious risk of returning to 
traditionally communist system. Recent political events in Eastern Europe cleared any 
suspicions: „the communist rule in Eastern Europe was finished”. This reality erodes 
Moscow’s confidence in the ex-Warsaw Pact members. But the impact of the transition made 
possible the new scenario of Eastern Europe: clearly, it is primarily to the national 
governments to solve the problems in their regions. A real „union” has to concentrate different 
market policies based on some sort of spontaneous balance between national difficulties and 
their own responsability in E.U. integration actions.  
  The progressive abandon of socialist planning appears inadequate in the light of 
communitarian cohesion. Taking into consideration this rquirement any national plan has to  
develop and persue its actions leading to the stregthening of its contribution to all community’s 
policies and to the implementation of a new mentality aiming to fulfil the condition of 
integration convergence6. For instance, if Romania is to join the E.U. in 2007 as planned it will 
have to conclude this year all negociations with Brusells in eight extremely sensitive areas 
including agriculture, envioronment, competition, juticer and domestic policy. 
  This new concurrential envioronement has to face transitions risks… Today over ten 
years, we come to accept that Eastern Europe have a different concept of risk in each national 
economy. In Romania, jobs might are lost to cheap imports from China or from West, because 
the reform cycle creates some anomalies-jobs, for instance. Indeed, cheap inports and cheap 
labour intorable of employement necessitates a fresh look at human potential: effective access 
of continuing training in Western countries. This new objective was designed to stabilise and to 
promote Eastern employment (E.U. established European Training Foundation opened to 
public or private sector participation by non-Community countries). 
  In this period, the severity pressures coming from communitarian programs, the new 
economy, the rising living standards and class distinction become rigid. The nearly ten years of 
market reforms have failed to transform agriculture and industry. In Russia, however, since the 
                                               
6 OJ L374 of 31.12.1988  (article 110 of the Regulation implementing the coordination of structural founds). 
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collapse of the ruble in late August, early September of 1998, all levels of Russian society are in 
danger; the meaning and importance of ruble will be enhanced further because transitions 
challenges will depreciate national currency. As in other Eastern country, the nearly seven years 
of market reforms have failed to transform agriculture and industry, and the devaluation of the 
ruble has made imports of food much more expensive, further straining Russians budgets7. 
These reasons explain the mutual interest for the region requiring compromise. Russia should 
pursue a major agenda, one unilateral and focused on transition’s reforms. To ensure that the 
costs of economic change to the new economy posture do not overwhelm the benefits, Russian 
administration  needed to carrefully think and calculate the reform programs, in all their 
dimensions: the military planning, the population protection, the security architecture, the 
diplomatic costs. After 1990, each strategic period shares a political responsability. Romania 
faced major challenges preventing hyperinflation, productivity, the severity of competitive 
pressures causing companies to keep reducing employment even after modest economic growth 
resumed in late 2000, the privatization and, for Russia, obtaining a better price for oil exports.  
One of the most important factors missing from the Eastern reform program is a 
widespread knowledge of capitalism, new social classes, etc. We should also spare a word for 
the Russian and Romanian political class as such, which is so often written off - not without 
reason - and accused of being immature and corrupt. At the  same time as Eastern 
accomphished some progress, Western investors were struggling against the problem of 
corruption. E.U. officials have been hoping that European assistance would signal the start of 
real reforms in Eastern Europe.  
The region had to reform dysfunctional political system; beyond immediate costs, the 
recent Romanian political reforms are indeed vital. For Romania, its new transition goal was 
to reach a consensus on West policy goal, because in a world torn up between the often violent 
affirmation of communitarian identities and the exigency of a global homologation of conduct 
and values, it is possible to invent a space inhabited by an entirely new political subject?8. 
                                               
7  Kristina Montgomery, Transition to Market in Russia/Social aspects of the transition to market capitalism, 
from web site: http://econc10.bu.edu/economic_systems/economics/transit/overview/trans_overview_russia.htm. 
8 Daniel Barbu, From Hard Communism to Soft Populism. Some remarks on the Romanian Cultures of 
Nationhood, Studia  Politica, vol. I, Meridiane, p. 730. 
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 Russia that Putin inherited was still a global power, a still strong and united one of 
world’s two superpowers. Russian struggle with the old imperialist elite in the conservative 
parties and the ex-military-industrial complex culminated with domestic reforms.  
 I would like to admite that after twenty years, Putin’s reform rationalisis some old 
perestroika measures as a step forward. For example, Putin has to restore series of 
administration dilemmas, among them, reducing, simplifying and formalizing the right to buy 
and sel land-a pledge to reduce the immense dead weight of the state bureaucracy...”the 
superflous presence of the state in the economy, said Putin recently, stifles entrepreuneurship 
and encourrage corruption”9, as Gorbachev sought transfered economic planning to the 
periphery, to the enterprise itself. Economic managers will be given the choice to decide what 
they produce. Putin’s plan creates more independent economic players in the market, by 
promoting the pluralism in all its aspects. 
 Admitelly, for E.U. inevestors, the current Russian leader is much more ambitious than 
any other predecessor. If Putin is to succed, he must convince West his reforms will produce 
results, by introducing policies designed to propose a compatible market economy with 
Western exigences. 
To oversimplify, I believe that Putin’s goal was to restore economic dynamism to an 
ideological system and revitalize Russia internationally to compete with the West. The authors 
did, however, agree that Russian political scenario predicted that Putin is about to become the 
second popularly reelected leader in Russian history, after Boris Yeltsin. They also agree the 
significance of Russian economic transition, predicting that it was about to become a „system 
change” and that Moscow’s crisis completes the image of the „universal crisis of socialism”.  
 
The third circle:  
... to E.U. technical and financial assistance10 
 
While emphasising the importance of reform, this analysis also examines E.U. political 
strategies to push the reform process forward in different countries11. E.U has to face East 
                                               
9 Christian Caryl and Frank Brown, No more excuses, Newsweek, 15 march, 2004, p.27 
10 For a general overview on E.U.-former Soviet countries new relation, see Une Union forte pour un 
élargissement réussi, Office des Publications Officielles des Communautes européennes, Luxembourg, 2000, 
p.2. 
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challenges: one of the most important factors missing from the Eastern reform program is a 
widespread knowledge of capitalism, new social classes, etc. 
  The most reasonable analysis for this period has to estimate the regional geometry of 
interests: U.S., Russia and Romania. This selection is comprehensive׃ the centrifugal forces 
were driven by the need of rethinking new tactical policies. 1990’s exposed the theory of 
compromise and mutual understanding between Moscow and Bruxelles. Second of all, to 
oversimplify, Romanian reform goal was to restore dynamism and peaceful relations. Western 
observers a problem of in-equality of political and economic transition in former communist 
countries12; they see current policy changes as general and largely internal matters, driven by 
the need for longer term prospects: „in the peaceful future…, Romania will strengthen in 
another way, as a bridge to a new Russia. America and Romania are friends to the Russian 
people”13. The situation in which Romania find itself necessitates special efforts to promote 
economic and social cohesion and thus enable it to comply with the communitarian criteria 
required for passage to the first stage of E.U. regional policies.  
  The objectives of the social program are very close to regional policy and national 
traditions, because E.U. regional assistance does not seek to replace national policies. The 
states are the first ones who must solve the problems in their regions by promoting 
infrastructures and financial supporting job-creation investments. But democratization of the 
Eastern market democratized risks at all, because transition made clear that European union 
was not yet prepared to lead the way into a substantially new international system. 
The possibilities for coordinating this objectives and means of new relation E.U.-
Eastern Europe have been given careful consideration by new strategies and multiservices 
assistance given an international backdrop of economic crisis.  Western declaration for helping 
East mobilised founds for projects, initiated conditions to ensure social compability West-East 
and persue a communitarian policy regardeless of Eastern level of economic developement. 
For E.U. that was the moment to promote and develop a private sector in each Eastern 
country, designed as a framework for a communitarian action: the operation PHARE ( Poland 
                                                                                                                                                   
11 ***, Agenda 2000. Renforcement et élergissement de l’Union Européenne, Office des Publications 
Officielles des Communautes européennes, Bruxelles, 2001, p.9. 
12 ***, Consommation éthique, proposal of International Congres: „L’Assemblée mondiale des citoyens”, 
organized by „Alliance pour un monde responsable, pluriel et solidaire”, Lille, 4-10 December, 2001, p.8-9 
13 George W. Bush, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, from the 2002 Presidential Documents 
Online via GPO Access [frwais.access.gpo.go]/Remarks to the People of the Romania in Bucharest, November 
23, p.2085-2086 
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and Hungary: aid for economic restructuring), extended in 1992 for almost all the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe stated determination of E.U. in establishing common rules and 
equal condition of integration. The technical and financial assistance programmes agreed with 
the recipient countries in the framework of the PHARE programme place the emphasis on 
breaking up monopolies, privatisation, the restructuring of nationalised firms, etc.14.  
There is also the support for transition to open market reforms coming from Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, because, after 1990, this „made Eastern Europe reform” 
potentially more dangerous that other predecessor, is the major opportunity to save the East 
from the dangers of its own traditionally socialist thinking.  
„European agreements” create a new dimension for communitarian commercial and 
economic support, creating specfic links and reflecting the growing interdependence between 
the Community and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, they incorporate previsions 
on the political dialogue and provide the free arrangement on industrial products.15. East faces 
major challenges preventing hyperinflation, productivity, the severity of competitive pressures 
causing companies to keep reducing employment even after modest economic growth resumed 
in late 2000, the privatization and, for Russia, obtaining a better price for oil exports.  
The liberalization of capital mouvements provides a new european recommandation: 
Western investors now can enjoy the facilities of national legal „framework”. Policymakers, 
analysts and experts agree a free-market economy in Russia will be available only if it will be 
found the best way to improve conditions within the nation. Russia continues to rely on other 
capitalist nations for help, and recently, a $10.2 million (US equivalent) loan from the I.M.F. 
was given to Russia to aid in the restructuring of the economy and E.U. plan exposed in 1999 
explain the new strategy for Russian future16. Authorities say that financial aid had not been 
made to anticipate Russian government victory in elections17. 
 In few years, the Community market will be opened to all Eastern products, by 
creating links and establishing a close relation attempting to compensate previous losses. The 
combination of politics, external influences, inefficiencies and system’s corruption could force 
the self-destruction of reform programs. Everyone from media to E.U. officials to Western 
                                               
14 Nicholas Moussis, Handbook of European Union, EDIT-EUR, Rixensart, 1995, p.329. 
15 OJ L319 of 21.12.1993 and OJ C315 of 22.11.1993. 
16 ***, L’Union Européenne dans le monde/ La Russie et les Nouveaux Etats indépendants, Office des 
Publications Officielles des Communautes européennes, Bruxelles, 2001, p.8. 
17 Michael Kramer, Rescuing Boris, Time, July 15, 1996, p. 28-37. 
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investors hope that Vladimir Putin’s victory this month would signal the start of real reforms 
in Russia. There is a theory suggesting Putin was only making the right noises to keep 
investors coming in18. Russians and Europeans as well no longer accept once reasonable 
explanations for why their lives and their standards never seem to improve. For European 
Union this is a new challenge, for East, its new transition goal is to reach a consensus on E.U. 
policy reform goal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
                                               
18 Frank Brown, A Rushuffled Deck, Newsweek, 22 march 2004, p.5. 
